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MARITIME GEOSTRATEGY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
CHINESE NAVY IN THE EARLY TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Xu Qi
Translated by Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein

This article, published in 2004 in China’s most prestigious military journal, China
Military Science, merits special attention as a cogent explanation for the recent acceleration in China’s naval development that has been manifested by the wide array of
sophisticated warships that have emerged from Chinese shipyards since 2000. Xu asserts
that contemporary Chinese maritime geostrategy is powerfully informed by a tragic history in which “China’s rulers shut the door to the outside world [and] the sea . . . was
neglected. . . . [Thus,] the sea became a springboard for invaders.” But the geostrategic
environment for China’s maritime expansion is now favorable, because of a confluence
of global trends, including the collapse of the USSR, the 9/11 attacks on the United
States, the emergence of a “large Chinese economic bloc” as a global force, and Beijing’s
newly agile diplomacy. The author reviews a number of aspects of China’s maritime
development, ranging from expanding commerce to new construction projects in the
Indian Ocean. Senior Captain Xu’s rationale for an expanded PLA Navy rests on his
contention that China’s “long period of prosperity [as well as] the Chinese nation’s exis1
tence, development, and great resurgence [all] increasingly rely on the sea.” He also is
frank in his concern about “a concentration of strategic power in the Asia-Pacific region
on [China’s] maritime flank.”

G

eostrategy represents a country’s effort in the world arena to use geographic orientation and principles to pursue and safeguard its national in2
terests. Entering the twenty-first century, China’s geostrategic relationships,
especially its maritime geostrategic relationships, are undergoing profound
change. This will have far-reaching consequences for the development of
China’s naval strategy. It will require China’s navy, when confronted with the
new geostrategic environment, to develop a new orientation from the perspective of geostrategic relationships.
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I. THE IMPORTANT EFFECTS OF THE KEY ELEMENTS OF
GEOGRAPHIC ORIENTATION AND THE MARITIME
GEOSTRATEGIC RIVALRY AMONG THE GREAT POWERS
When considering the geographical relationships between states in order to
study a given state’s geostrategy, the state’s geographical position, comprehensive national power, and spaces separating it [from other powers can be seen to]
constitute the essential elements of [its] geographic orientation and [to] have a
fundamental influence on a nation-state’s development, strength, and
prosperity.
1. The Interrelation between the Sea and National Power Is a Vital Determining
Factor in the Long-Term Prosperity of the State
Two basic factors in geostrategy are geographic orientation and geography. For a
given country, the factor of geographic orientation is a variable, but the factor of
3
geography is a constant. The geographical factor consists primarily of the geographical environment and position. In history, the geographic orientation afforded by a nation-state’s geographical position and its rise and decline have
been closely related. England is a typical case of a maritime state. Enjoying a geographical position of exceptional advantage, which afforded it both relative separation from the European mainland as well as control over northern European
sea lanes and critical straits, it held sway over Continental Europe and maintained the balance of power to prevent the emergence of any Continental
hegemon, thereby enabling it to create a colossal colonial empire holding sway
over the entire world.
The United States, on the other hand, is situated between two great oceans,
with its territory surrounded by vast sea areas that place it far away from Eurasian battlefields. This has provided an advantageous environment for national
development. Furthermore, [the United States] benefited from the guidance of
[Alfred Thayer] Mahan’s theories of sea power, and unceasingly pressed forward
in the maritime direction, capturing in succession Hawaii and the Marianas
Islands in the Pacific Ocean, expanding its strategic depth on its maritime flank,
securing an advantageous maritime geostrategic posture, [and thus] establishing a firm foundation for its move into the world’s first-rank powers. One can
draw a contrast with Germany, which although a nation proximate to the sea,
with its location in Central Europe—unlike the maritime powers—more easily
got caught up in two-front wars. [Friedrich] Engels, in analyzing why Germany
lagged behind England in the nineteenth century, said, “First, Germany’s geographic position is disadvantageous, because it is too far from the world trade
thoroughfare of the Atlantic Ocean. The second reason is that from the sixteenth
century until the present, Germany has been drawn continuously into wars, all
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of which were fought on its own territory.” Inland states such as Poland, which
was stuck between Germany and the Soviet Union, suffered predation from
their neighbors, owing to their geographical position. Other inland states, such
as those of the Balkan Peninsula, suffered invasion and domination by their enemies even more frequently, causing these states to suffer still more from retarded
development.
2. The Sea Has a Profound Influence on a State’s Power and Prosperity
A nation’s geostrategy, including its national power, the fundamental geographical factor, can more or less determine its levels of development and strength.
The American naval strategist Mahan [1840–1914] suggested geographical position, naturally good natural ports, territorial area, population numbers, national qualities, and government system as six key elements that are indicative of
a great maritime power. This suggests that, in order to become a great maritime
power, it is necessary to possess those key elements of national power related to
the sea. It also reflects the profound influence of the key element of maritime
geostrategy for a nation’s power and prosperity.

In terms of the key factors that constitute comprehensive national power, a
nation’s territorial area, natural resources, population size, and [national] qualities are the most fundamental conditions. More than other factors, these bases
of a nation’s economic and military power reflect a nation’s geographic orientation. During the Second World War, Nazi Germany made a clean sweep of Europe,
capturing much of the territory of the Soviet Union. But the contest of the war was
a contest of comprehensive national powers. Although the former Soviet Union
occupied a geographical area nine times that of Germany and so possessed massive material resources, it still had to depend on aid from Britain and the United
States. Britain at that time could not match Germany’s national strength; however, by depending on seaborne aid from the United States [it] was able to
mount a tenacious resistance. Only the United States, however, could rely on its
solid maritime position as an advantage, [by this means] accumulating massive
comprehensive national power, unceasingly providing the Allies with large
quantities of goods and materials for lease, [and thus] becoming a powerful
world force for justice in defeating the strong forces of the fascists. Entering the
twenty-first century, the United States draws support from the economic and
military might of other strong maritime powers, [and in so doing] reinforces the
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geographical weight of its comprehensive national power. It stubbornly adheres
to the path of unilateralism and hegemonism, to such an extent as to violate the
spirit of the UN Charter and widely recognized norms of the international system, [by] invading sovereign states under the pretext of counterterrorism, [by]
gravely assaulting the existing international order, and [thus] constituting an
immense challenge to the trend of multipolarization.
3. The Direct Relationship between the Geographical Significance of Vast
Maritime Space and National Security
Oftentimes, threats to a nation’s interests—particularly its security interests—
increase as their spatial distances decrease. Even before the Second World War
broke out, both Germany and the Soviet Union invaded Poland in order to expand their defensive buffer zones. Historically, the states of Central and Eastern
Europe have been in a zone of rivalry between the Western great powers and
Russia. During the Cold War, the former Soviet Union used Eastern Europe as a
protective screen in order to expand its security space. Since the Cold War, the
United States, as the head of NATO, has repeatedly infringed on Russia’s strategic space, first by moving the line of defense more than eight hundred kilometers toward the Russian border, [and] most recently with another round of
expansion, both breaking through the not-to-be-exceeded “red line” stretching
from the Baltic to the Black Sea that Russia designated, and approaching to a distance of some tens of kilometers from St. Petersburg, [thereby] causing Russia’s
northwestern flank to be directly exposed. The vast expanses of the ocean thus
establish the direct relationship between maritime geostrategic position and national security interests.
The ancient defenders of China’s central plains faced numerous neighbors on
the northern flank, [yet] had no benefit of [strategic depth and buffer zones].
From the Qin dynasty [221–207 BC] onward, each dynasty invariably expended
much of its manpower and material resources in repairing the Great Wall, in order to resist the harassing attacks from its close neighbors. This had a grave effect
on the development of productivity. By contrast, Japan, separated by water from
China, succeeded in using the sea as a protective screen. [This screen] was removed only in the mid-twentieth century, by the American occupiers, [Japan]
never having before in [its] history suffered invasion by foreigners. Of course,
the geographical consequence of maritime space has sometimes also constituted
an indirect threat. Take, for example, the Korean Peninsula and China’s other adjoining neighbors, which were often conquered by foreign invaders and became
a springboard for attacking China, thereby precipitating wars. At present, the
crisis on the peninsula remains serious, influencing the stability of the Northeast
Asian region.
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Moreover, because of the progress of science and technology and developments over time, the function of the geography of maritime space is not really
immutable. In the process of industrialization, Western states cut across the natural barriers of the oceans and with their heavily armed ships smashed down
China’s gate. During the Cold War era, the United States and the Soviet Union
undertook an arms race, which was especially intense with regard to increases in
the quantity and range of nuclear weapons, and over an even greater space
reached a position of mutual [threat]. Since the Cold War, the United States has
vigorously strengthened its advanced military machine, relying especially on information superiority and all along maintaining the forward presence of its formidable fleet, which is able to project power over thousands of kilometers. But
the 9/11 event caused the United States to recognize that underground nonstate
terrorist groups had the capability to organize a network within the United
States, with the ability to project power against a target at a distance of fifteen
thousand kilometers. This made it clear that the vast ocean space could not allow
the United States to avoid being struck, thereby greatly transforming geographical theories regarding space and distance.
4. Throughout History, the Struggles for Supremacy among the Great Powers
Have Always Emphasized Maritime Geostrategic Rivalry
Historically, great powers struggling for supremacy have invariably focused
their attention on the ocean and spared no efforts in pursuing their maritime
geostrategic rivalries. At the end of the eighteenth century, Napoleon sought to
expel England from the European continent, and toward that end advanced into
the Mediterranean on the southern flank and attempted to cut England off from
its foreign markets and natural resources by way of the Persian Gulf. On the
other hand, the key elements of England’s strategy were its alliance with Russia
and maintenance of its maritime power in the Mediterranean. As early as the
reign of Peter the Great, Russia initiated a military struggle to gain access to the
sea. It successively achieved access to seaports along its northern flank and expanded its influence to the Black Sea and the Persian Gulf, even contending for
the Black Sea Straits, as well as nibbling at the Balkan Peninsula. Napoleon’s defeat caused the breakdown of the balance of power among the great European
powers, as England and Russia emerged as the new hegemonic contenders. Russia’s strategic goal was to rise beyond the Baltic littoral and the Black Sea to break
through England’s blockade line. England’s goal was to contain Russia’s westward and southward advance, while at the same time preserving maritime hegemony in the Mediterranean Sea and also the Indian Ocean.
Meanwhile, the United States was quietly rising on the western side of the Atlantic Ocean. The First and Second World Wars both spread from the Atlantic
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Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. In the Atlantic Ocean, England and Germany struggled for mastery of Europe, following the same path as England and France had
in the nineteenth century. In the Pacific Ocean, the struggle for mastery between
the United States and Japan mirrored the great power struggle in Europe. During the Cold War era, the focus of the rivalry between the United States and the
Soviet Union also expanded from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean, but
their contention for supremacy followed the path of West-East containment and
counter-containment, with the struggle advancing onto the Balkan and
Indochinese peninsulas [and] reaching a final decisive engagement in the northern Indian Ocean. Since the Cold War, the eastward expansion of NATO has
once again erected a new “Iron Curtain” stretching from the Baltic to the Balkans. One may view England, the United States, and such maritime powers as
the “spear,” the sharp point of which is fundamentally directed at containing
both flanks, surrounding Central Asia, and then infiltrating into the Indian
Ocean. And France, Germany, Russia, and such continental powers constitute
the “shield,” supporting both flanks for the decisive battle in Central Asia and
the ultimate advance into the Indian Ocean.
II. THE PROCESS OF CHINA’S ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF
MARITIME GEOSTRATEGY
Although ancient China did not employ a geostrategic conception, there was already geostrategic theory, especially such geostrategies as “uniting the vertical
and linking the horizontal,” which were directly employed in actual combat.5
But in the modern era, the development of geostrategic theory fell behind that
of the West, and the understanding of maritime geostrategy witnessed a protracted process of development.
1. The Differences between Chinese and Western Maritime
Geostrategic Thinking
Western geostrategic theory is principally rooted in aggressive and expansionist
goals. This macroscopic geostrategic characteristic is completely obvious. The
[scholarship of] Englishman [Sir Halford John] MacKinder [1861–1947] is representative of Western geostrategic theory, which takes a broad, global view. As a
result of its origins in the ruthlessly violent struggle for existence and the long
period of frequent warfare, this theory emphasized that the primary method of
national survival is external expansion. Each state fully emphasizes the building
of peripheral arcs of control, in order to increase the state’s degree of security.
Other geostrategic thought also displays this aggressive and expansionist nature.
After the Great Age of Geographic Discovery of the fifteenth century, the mad
dash for overseas colonies and colonial empire building unfolded on a global
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scale. At the same time, Western geostrategic thought paid close attention to security developments both on land and at sea, and even representatives of the
“continental school” such as MacKinder stressed the comparative analysis of
land and maritime power, concluding that human history was principally a
struggle between land power and sea power. Mahan [, by contrast,] was a representative of the “sea power school,” which placed even greater emphasis on the
global antagonism between land and sea powers, advocating that maritime
states should seek to control a fringe belt on the Eurasian landmass. The modern
sea power school emphasizes the problems of continental powers, their sea
lanes, and their continental shelves. Thus, Western geostrategic thinkers have
not historically had the tendency to emphasize continental power over naval
power and have generally created systematic land and sea power theories.

Because China was exposed over a long period to the Confucian school notions of benevolence and justice, as well as the “doctrine of the mean” philosophy, the influence of these notions was relatively deep. China has always pursued
peaceful coexistence with neighboring countries, taking the form of a national
tradition of goodwill and good-neighborliness. China’s field of vision was
strictly limited to its own territory and borders, [although] the Ming dynasty
[Adm.] Zheng He’s seven voyages into the Western Ocean opened up a maritime
6
silk route, which preceded the Western Great Age of Discovery by a century. But
in comparison to the Western great powers’ [ships], loaded to capacity with firearms and gunpowder that wantonly slaughtered and pillaged colonies in a
frenzy, all that Zheng He’s flotillas carried was silk and porcelain, bringing good
will and friendship to each country. The land area of ancient China was vast and
its actual power and level of cultural development invariably surpassed those of
neighboring countries. The primary threat to the imperial court on the central
plains was the northern nomadic peoples moving south, so that successive
dynasties all built [up] the Great Wall in order to resist this continental threat.
This geographical characteristic determined that most of China’s wars were
ground campaigns. Even if during the Ming dynasty Japanese pirates and small
Western colonial powers invaded China’s littoral, they did not pose a threat to
imperial rule. Although in the Qing dynasty [Gen.] Zuo Zongtang [1812–85]
emphasized paying equal attention to land and sea challenges, he was unable to
7
have any real impact. This kind of land-based survival viewpoint had firm and
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deep roots, causing Chinese geostrategic thought from beginning to end to emphasize land power at the expense of sea power.
2. Chinese Maritime Strategic Thought Was Gravely Restricted
From ancient times, China had the beginnings of maritime geostrategic thinking.
In the Warring States period [which began in the fifth century BC and culminated
in the unification of China for the first time by the Qin dynasty in 221 BC], [China]
developed a coastal economy. Zheng He’s intercontinental navigation as envoy
across the Western Ocean, in particular, had a strong geographical impact on the
consolidation of coastal defense, as well as [for] promoting development in
Southeast Asia. But after a long period, China’s foundation of a self-sufficient
agricultural economy and its viewpoint of “China as the center [of the world]”
doomed the Zheng He expeditions and such appreciation and accomplishments
of maritime geostrategy to the same fate as the continuously declining feudal society, and [it] remained silent thereafter. During the period of the European
great powers’ unbridled colonial expansion, China’s rulers shut the door to the
outside world with Decree(s) Forbidding Seafaring.8 This societal attitude of
closing oneself off runs counter to the openness and global circulation characteristic of the ocean itself.

In the world, island nations surrounded on four sides by water, such as England and Japan; other coastal nations that focused on external development
historically, such as Portugal [and] the Netherlands; as well as the contemporary
United States; can all be described as strong maritime nations. The major characteristics of their geostrategies include a tendency to emphasize overseas trade
and alliance strategy, a greater reliance on threats than actual combat, and the
maintenance of supremacy at sea and balance of power on land, etc. The fundamental patterns and characteristics of the geostrategies of coastal nations [are as
follows]: first, having a contiguous border with the vast ocean [such that]
geostrategy must take [both] land and sea into account; second, having some
space on land in which to operate, as well as maritime barriers and transport
corridors that can be utilized. When engaged in war with maritime powers,
[coastal nations] have been able to bring their strength to bear on land and limit
the opportunities of their adversaries to occupy territory. When engaged in war
with neighboring land powers, they have had to concentrate forces on their land
flanks, especially to avoid being attacked from the front and rear on land and sea
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[and in this manner] fall into the trap of being encircled by an alliance of sea and
land powers. With respect to military structure, [such powers] have emphasized
a balanced mix of land and sea forces and having a geostrategy that comports
with this balance.
These characteristics have been reflected to some degree in China’s naval
geostrategic conception. Both France and Germany are coastal nations, but the
extent of their coasts is somewhat different, and the emphasis that they place on
land and sea has [also] been somewhat different. Although Russia has a very extensive coastline, most of this coast is frozen during a majority of the year, inhibiting its strategic maritime disposition. Therefore, both Germany and Russia’s
geostrategies have emphasized land power. China’s coastline is quite extensive,
but its land-sea orientation was powerfully influenced by the special circumstances of its neighbors; for a time, the sea was viewed as a solid barrier and so
was neglected. In modern times, the sea became a springboard for foreign invaders. While the great powers were smashing in [China’s] maritime gate, China
[simultaneously] confronted the expansionist czarist Russia and dared not let
down its guard on its land flank. This clearly illustrates how a nation’s maritime
geostrategy can be affected by its relationship with its neighbors on land.
3. The Present Situation and Development of China’s Maritime Geostrategic
Relationships
The geostrategic theory of the People’s Republic of China is represented by
[Chairman] Mao Zedong’s “three worlds” theory, which analyzed the division
9
and composition of world political power from a geographical perspective.
Deng Xiaoping applied the “North-South and East-West” theoretical relationships to analyze the world situation and geostrategic structure, [thus] providing
an incisive framework for understanding the relationship between global strategic power and geostrategy.10 These concepts helped to safeguard China’s borders
and, from geographical factors, established the overall conception of national
foreign policy. In particular, serious deliberations on maritime geostrategy
within this framework reflect the general direction of the development of
China’s maritime geostrategy.
A. China’s Maritime Geostrategic Development Faces Historical Opportunities.
The “collapse of the Soviet Union” that occurred in the twentieth century and
the “9/11” event of the twenty-first century caused a great transformation of the
international strategic situation and had a profound effect on the global
geostrategic situation. At the same time, these events have provided historical
opportunities for China’s maritime geostrategic development. Along with
China’s full-speed economic development, the economies of Taiwan, Hong
Kong, and Macau [have] gradually integrated, thus forming a large Chinese
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss4/5
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economic bloc. This development of economic and geostrategic relations precipitated a turning point. At the same time, the geostrategic environment along
China’s borders has obviously improved. At the end of the twentieth century,
China successively concluded border demarcation talks with neighboring countries and signed a “Friendship Cooperation Treaty” with Russia. With China and
Russia in the leading roles, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, operating
on the principles of mutual confidence, equality, and cooperation [and] on the
basis of a “New Security Concept,” initiated and implemented a model of regional cooperation. In 2003, China and India signed the “Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Co-operation” and the two countries’
navies carried out joint exercises for the first time. Meanwhile, China, still
adhering to multilateral diplomacy, signed a “Joint Declaration on Bilateral Cooperation” with Pakistan. In 2002, at the Greater Mekong Subregion Senior Officials’ Meeting [the SOM, held in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, on 25 September
2002] and the ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] Leadership
Meeting, China adopted toward ASEAN the policies of “eliminating the
deep-rooted China threat theory [and] guaranteeing [that] economic development cannot destabilize the peripheral environment” and simultaneously published a declaration on avoiding conflict [concerning] the sovereignty of the
Spratly Islands. In 2003, in the ASEAN Forum Ministerial Conference and
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation conference, China [formally joined] the
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. China and ASEAN [also]
signed a trade agreement and initiated a dialogue concerning security and cooperation. China’s Bo Ao Asia Forum established the theme of “Asia seeking
common gains, [and] cooperatively promoting development,” [which has] had
important significance for promoting peace and stability on China’s maritime
borders, the region, and even the world.
B. China’s Maritime Geostrategic Security Continues to Face Threats. The tension of the world situation has eased overall, but hegemonism and power politics still exist and have become major causes of threats to world and regional
peace and stability. There exist many uncertain factors in the security environment along China’s borders, especially in the maritime dimension. In particular,
China faces a concentration of strategic power in the Asia-Pacific region on its
maritime flank. The geostrategic tendency is dangerously uncertain. Since this
maritime strategic region and, more broadly, the strategic region of the periphery of the Eurasian landmass constitute points of contention, they are also important arenas for global great-power competition. From a geostrategic
perspective, China’s heartland faces the sea, the benefits of economic development are increasingly dependent on the sea, [and] security threats come from
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C. China’s Maritime Geostrategic Relations Are Developing amid Trends of
Global Integration. China’s maritime strategic development, [spurred by]
global integration, is continuously expanding the strategic influence of maritime geostrategic tendencies. On issues of international security, China emphasizes both cooperation and contestation, stressing that any security measure
must be taken in the interest of collective security. China has played an active

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss4/5

C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Autumn2006.vp
Tuesday, October 10, 2006 11:12:52 AM

12

Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite Default screen

58

Qi et al.: Maritime Geostrategy and the Development of the Chinese Navy in t

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

role in the Six Party Talks pertaining to the North Korean nuclear problem and
has also worked with its neighbors such as ASEAN states in an active effort to
improve China’s maritime geostrategic posture. Through cooperation with
nearby countries, during the 1990s, China constructed harbor wharves in the
eastern Indian Ocean in Burma [and] cleared the Mekong waterways, in order
to gain access to the sea in [China]’s southwest. In 2003, China leased a port in
Russia’s Far East and negotiated with Russia in an attempt to develop the mouth
12
of the Tumen River. On the Makran seacoast of southwest Pakistan, China invested U.S. $1 billion to construct a deepwater port [at Gwadar], in order to establish a trade and transport hub for Central Asian nations and simultaneously
expand China’s geostrategic influence. For the past few years, China has provided aid to the South Pacific region and also strengthened economic and trade
ties. Particularly since entering the World Trade Organization, [China] has
strengthened economic and trade cooperation with Africa and the Caribbean
region. These [achievements have] all contributed to the development of
China’s maritime geostrategic relationships.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA’S MARITIME GEOSTRATEGIC
RELATIONS AND NAVAL STRATEGIC CHOICES
China is [part of] what the geostrategist MacKinder termed the “the Inner or
Marginal Crescent” on the fringe of the Eurasian landmass, with undoubted
geostrategic preponderance on the continent. China’s sea areas are linked from
south to north and connected to the world’s oceans; however, passage in and out
of the [open] ocean is obstructed by two island chains. [China’s] maritime
geostrategic posture is [thus] in a semi-enclosed condition. Entering the
twenty-first century, in order to carry out its primary mission of safeguarding
the nation’s maritime interests, China’s navy must make [important] strategic
choices with regard to the nation’s maritime borders, its maritime domain, the
global oceans, and the overall strategic space.
1. The Nation’s Strategic Choice Concerning Land and Sea Territory
Reviewing history, China over a long period of time undertook a policy that forbade maritime activities, [thus] precipitating a “deliberate absence” from the
world’s oceans. These Chinese policies enabled the Portuguese, who did not
have an Eastern sea power with which to contend, to rapidly achieve dominance
in the Indian Ocean.13 If the world were forever isolated on the basis of separate
oceans, this would perhaps not have a great effect on a nation. But from the beginning of the nineteenth century, the world’s oceans melded together into an
integrated thoroughfare. In particular, economic and technological development made global integration [both] a requirement and a possibility. An
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increasingly connected and inseparable world was reduced in scale to a “global
village.” If a nation ignored maritime connectivity, it would lack a global perspective for planning and developing, and it would likely have difficulties in
avoiding threats to its security.
A. The Interconnection between Land Territory and Maritime Territory. Land
territory is a nation’s terrestrial territory, [whereas] maritime territory is categorized as a nation’s sea territory. China’s land territory [encompasses] 9.6 million
square kilometers, the fourth largest in the world; hence, China is a great land
power. But China’s maritime territory is also extremely vast. On the basis of the
provisions of the “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea” and
China’s [claims], China has jurisdiction over and administers three million
square kilometers of maritime space. This is equivalent to the combined geographical dimensions of twenty Shandong provinces or thirty Jiangsu provinces.
Coastal seas and continental-shelf areas [combine to] approach 273 million
hectares. This area is more than two times that of China’s total arable land. For
coastal nations, the development of land and maritime territory are equally important. As for China, with the world’s largest population and relatively deficient resources, the sea is even more the most important strategic space for
sustainable development. [As land resources are depleted], the sea can serve as a
strategic resource replacement area.
B. The Significance of the Maritime Domain for China’s Future Development Is
Still More Far-Reaching. China is a great maritime power: it has a very long
shoreline, numerous islands, vast administered sea areas, and abundant ocean
resources. For the past few years, it has become a world energy-development focal point for “methane hydrates”; the reserves in China are vast. The country’s
long period of prosperity [as well as] the Chinese nation’s existence, development, and great resurgence [all] increasingly rely on the sea. At the same time,
the sea is an important realm for the nation to participate in international competition. It is the nation’s main artery of foreign trade. Along with the accelerating process of economic globalization, China’s maritime economy is moving
toward the great oceans. By 2020, China’s maritime commerce will exceed U.S.
$1 trillion. It may be[come] necessary to import three-quarters of [China’s] oil
from overseas. Sea lines of communication [are] becom[ing] lifelines of national existence [and] development. At the same time, the maritime economy is
a burgeoning economic realm with huge development potential. More than
twenty clusters of industrial groupings have been developed, while maintaining
the relatively rapid pace of [overall] development. In 2001, major maritime industry increased in value to 3.44 percent of GDP [and is] estimated to reach approximately 5 percent by 2010, thus becoming an important pillar and a new
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss4/5
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growth point of national economic development. Vigorously developing the
ocean economy involves forming a coastal belt economic zone [encompassing
the] continental shelf, while also administering maritime economic zones and
international seabed mining zones together as a [unified] maritime economic
zone. Simultaneously, the drive for further development of the terrestrial economy, by forming great ocean provinces, counties, and cities, with [China’s] eastern area taking the lead in modernization and comprehensively constructing a
[relatively] affluent society, [will be] an enormous contribution.
C. Naval Strategic Choices Must Be Grounded in the Imperative to Defend
National Maritime Territory. The navy is the armed force [with which the nation can] resist threats from the sea. Defending national sovereignty [and] upholding national maritime rights and interests are sacred duties with which the
navy has been entrusted. In peacetime, the navy devotes itself to defending each
maritime area within the scope of nationally administered sovereignty. National
political, economic, and diplomatic policies are closely interrelated and in general directly embody national will. Under specific conditions, [such policies]
achieve national political and diplomatic goals. After its founding, the People’s
Liberation Army Navy, from the north at the mouth of the Yalu River to the
south in the vicinity of the Beilun River’s mouth, carried out its unshakable historical mission. Along with continuously expanding maritime and overseas interests, the relationship between maritime rights and interests and fundamental
national interests becomes ever more significant. To meet the requirements of national security and development interests, the navy must not only develop the
important function of defending national sovereignty but also unceasingly
move toward [the posture of] a “blue-water navy” [and] expand the scope of
maritime strategic defense, in order to contribute to the defense of national
maritime rights and interests. To this end, the navy must take to heart the maritime interests of the nation, pay close attention to changes in the circumstances
of maritime geostrategy, raise the nation’s naval defense combat capability,
[and] provide [a] reliable guarantee of national maritime security.
2. The Strategic Choice of Offshore Regions and Open Ocean Areas
The navy is the maritime defense component of the armed forces, which has an
important international role because naval vessels are symbols of state power
14
and authority. [Naval vessels] are not only adept at administering waters [over
which China has jurisdiction] but also can act as “mobile territory” and freely
15
navigate the high seas of the world. These special characteristics of naval forces
determine that their mission is not limited to offshore defense.
Offshore defense is the fundamental guarantee of national maritime security.
In the 1970s, Deng Xiaoping promulgated our strategy of preparation for
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C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Autumn2006.vp
Tuesday, October 10, 2006 11:12:52 AM

15

Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite Default screen

Naval War College Review, Vol. 59 [2006], No. 4, Art. 5

XU QI

61

combat in the offshore area, since the main scope of our maritime strategic defense was close in to shore. This was done for the purpose of designating a practical set of strategic guidelines for China’s navy and includes the scope of
sovereignty of China’s territorial waters and islands, etc. It also covers all maritime areas over which China has jurisdiction under international maritime law.
The distinguishing feature of the maritime strategy put forward on this “offshore defense” foundation is the realization of national unification, giving a
prominent position to the safeguarding of maritime rights and interests [and]
emphasizing that the navy must be able to respond to a regional war at sea, [as
well as] to neutralize enemy encroachments. According to the requirements of
national interests and the development of naval battle operations capability,
the scope of naval strategic defense should progressively expand. In the direction of the South China Sea, the sea area extends 1,600 nautical miles from
mainland China, but the scope of naval strategic defense is still within the first
island chain.
Open ocean-area defense is an essential shield of long-term national interests. At the end of the twentieth century, the weapons systems of [certain] powerful nations developed extremely rapidly and quickly made other nations’
weapons “technologically obsolete.” In the future, some maritime powers may
employ long-range strike weapons to attack into the depths of China. The vast,
unobstructed character of the naval battlefield [is] favorable for military force
concentration, mobility, [force projection], [and] initiating sudden attacks. Future at-sea informationalized warfare has characteristics of noncontact and
nonlinearity [and] in particular uses advanced informationalized weapons,
space weapons, and new-concept weapons, etc. [It] can carry out multidimensional precision attacks in the sea area beyond the first island chain [and]
threaten important political, economic, and military targets within strategic
depth. The maritime security threat comes from the open ocean. [This] requires
the navy to cast the field of vision of its strategic defense to the open ocean [and
to] develop attack capabilities for battle operations [on] exterior lines, in order
to hold up the necessary shield for the long-term development of national
interests.
3. The Strategic Choice of World Maritime Space and Grand Strategic Space
Facing the situation of a new rapid revolution in military affairs, China’s navy, in
order to adapt [to] the requirements of national interest, must also make strategic choices [with] a vast field of vision, in the world maritime space, in inner and
outer space, and in the entire strategic space.
The development of national interests [in] world maritime space. From the
composition of geostrategic relations, one can plainly see that the main territory
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for human mobility, aside from land, also includes the grand strategic spaces of
world ocean space, atmospheric space, and outer space, etc. These do not belong
to any nation but rather to regions of global passage [and] are called “common
space.” The world maritime space comprises three sections, [ranging] from na-

tionally administered sovereign interior waters [to] the entire “international
waters” beyond the territorial-sea exclusive economic zone, [to] the seabed at a
depth of 3,000–3,500 meters or more, beyond which nations do not have the
right of jurisdiction, as well as the [ocean] bottom’s entire “international seabed
area” [and] the “international navigation channels” beyond the breadth of national territorial seas. Aside from Antarctica, almost every piece of land in the
world has explicit jurisdiction. World oceans beyond the scope of sovereignty
and administration, all “international maritime space,” comprise a total area of
64.2 percent of total ocean area (approximately 231 million square kilometers).
This area is regarded as high seas for humanity’s common use. All nations may
use it with freedom and equality. In international affairs, China attends globalized maritime scientific research activities, develops ocean science and technological cooperation extensively, and jointly develops the ocean with other
countries. We have numerous national interests in “international maritime
space” and “international navigation channels,” [our] open ocean transport
routes pass through every continent and every ocean, [we] navigate through
each important international strait, [and we] have experience with over six hundred ports in over 150 nations and [administrative] regions. China is the fifth
largest investor in international seabed-area [development]. In 1991, with the
permission of the UN International Seabed Authority, China obtained seventyfive thousand square kilometers of special joint exploration [and] development
area in the Pacific Ocean southeast of Hawaii and within this area possesses in16
ternational seabed development rights [to] an abundance of metal nodules.
[China’s] ocean technology and economy are constantly developing, [and its]
national interests are spread all over the world ocean space. This requires the
navy to defend a larger scope.
Space warfare has a profound influence on naval warfare. An essential factor
in geographic orientation is spaceflight technology development cutting
across the atmosphere and space. Outer space has become a hot spot for world
powers to race to seize and a strategic space of the utmost importance for
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2006
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future warfare. Space weapons can not only strike the enemy’s satellites in
space [but] can also attack any terrestrial target from space. They have a tremendous influence on land and sea warfare. As early as 1964, the U.S. promulgated [the notion that] “control of space means control of the world” and later
advanced plans for both “Star Wars” and “Missile Defense.” [The United States
also] put forward such new concepts as “space deterrence” and “using space to
control the sea,” striving to seize absolute superiority in the space domain. In
2001, the U.S. had a hundred military satellites and 150 commercial satellites
in space, which constituted nearly half the world’s satellites. During the Iraq
War in 2003, the U.S. used over fifty satellites to support battle operations. U.S.
Secretary of Defense [Donald] Rumsfeld planned to emphasize strengthening
the military development of space, to define and master the “space control”
mission, to spend U.S. $165 billion on space-related activities in fiscal years
2002–2007, [and] to implement long-range precision strike and achieve decisive victory [by] guiding land, sea, and space-based platforms, either through
direct sea and land attacks or rapid minimum casualty war in order to capture
[objectives]. China’s launch of the Shenzhou 5 manned spacecraft [on 15 October 2003] was successful. China [thereby] became only the third nation, after
Russia and the U.S., to be capable of launching a human into space. This demonstrated that our country’s national interests already extend to the reaches of
outer space. [Space] has become China’s strategic interest and new “high
ground.” At the same time, it also demonstrates that our satellite communications, global positioning, and radar information and transmission systems,
etc., have obtained prominent success. [This] is beneficial for enhancing the
information strength to safeguard our sea power.
The navy’s strategic choice must be oriented toward the world’s oceans and
formulated with a perspective of the grand strategic space. Confronting a world
that [has] enter[ed] the space age, China’s navy must aim in the development direction of the new global revolution in military affairs, actively advance a revolution in military affairs with Chinese characteristics, [and] on the basis of
informatization leading mechanization, accelerate the achievement of
informatization. At the same time, it is still more essential to surmount traditional concepts of geographic orientation, to closely monitor the development
of space technology and space weapons in maritime warfare with a long-term
perspective, [and] to build a powerful navy that possesses relative space superiority. In order to answer the threat from the sea, it must continue to improve
China’s maritime geostrategic posture and contribute to peace, progress, and
development in the region.
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balance against Qin. The
[Horizontally
Linked] school advocated allying with Qin to
benefit from its rise. Qin ultimately defeated its
opponents by using the Horizontally Linked
strategy to divide them and its superior power
to conquer them one by one.
6.

郑和 [Zheng He], a Muslim eunuch official of

China’s Ming Dynasty, was sent by the Yongle
emperor Zhu Di on voyages to collect tribute
and establish friendly relations with neighboring countries. His “Treasure Fleet” is said to
have borne over twenty-eight thousand skilled
workers and soldiers on sixty-two ships, some
as much as six hundred feet in length. Such
ships dwarfed those of their European contemporaries, such as Christopher Columbus.
Zheng He’s seven voyages from 1405 to 1433,
which reportedly ranged as far away as the Indian Ocean, have been recorded in “
” [Zheng He to the Western Ocean].
While these missions were generally exploratory and commercial in nature, it has been
widely recorded that they also engaged decisively in substantial armed conflicts in Southeast Asia. On this last point, see Louise
Levathes, When China Ruled the Seas: The
Treasure Fleet of the Dragon Throne, 1405–1433
(New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1994).
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7. General Zuo, in three decades of distinguished
government service, suppressed numerous internal rebellions and advocated military modernization based on learning from the West.
Zuo recorded his greatest military achievement
in 1878, when he put down a Muslim uprising
and helped negotiate Russian withdrawal from
Ili, a border region now in China’s Xinjiang
province. In 1884, Zuo was given the concurrent appointments of commander in chief, imperial commissioner of an expeditionary force,
and Lord Admiral of the Navy. This was part of
a larger Qing Dynasty effort to develop four
[North Sea],
steamship fleets:
[Fujian], and
[Guang[South Sea],
dong]. Zuo marshaled national forces for the
Sino-French war in Fujian Province but died
shortly before China was forced to conclude a
humiliating truce with France in Fuzhou the
following year, after its loss of a naval battle at
Mawei on 23 August 1884.
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” [Sea Ban]. This and
restrictions as the “
related edicts sought to ban private maritime
trade in a counterproductive effort apparently
directed at suppressing piracy and other unlawful activities. For this reason, the West’s “new
theories on sea strategies were rejected by China
and did not have a significant influence on it.”
[Liu Huaqing],
[The
See
Memoirs of Liu Huaqing] (Beijing: People’s Liberation Army, 2004), pp. 433, 524. Admiral Liu
served as PLA Navy commander (1982–88) and
vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (1989–97). All original quotations from
Liu’s autobiography were checked against the
wording in the FBIS translation of chapters 16–
20, CPP20060707320001001. Wording different
from the FBIS translation is used whenever the
authors felt that it better reflected Liu’s meaning
or would be more comprehensible to the reader.

刘华清

刘华清回忆录

9. In 1974, Mao stated, “The United States and the
Soviet Union belong to the first world. The inbetween Japan, Europe and Canada belong to
the second world. The third world is very populous. Except [for] Japan, Asia belongs to the
third world.” Mao advocated supporting third
world nations in their efforts to avoid domination by the first world superpowers. See
“Chairman Mao Zedong’s Theory on the Division of the Three World[s] and the Strategy of
Forming an Alliance against an Opponent,” Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China,
17 November 2000, available at www.fmprc.gov
.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/t18008.htm.
10. In Deng’s view, international security hinged on
relations between nations in the East and the
West, whereas economic development hinged
on relations between nations in the North and
the South. See “Peace and Development Are the
Two Outstanding Issues in the World Today,” 4
March 1985, People’s Daily, available at english
.people.com.cn/dengxp/vol3/text/c1330.html.

11. Notably articulated by Adm. Liu Huaqing, the
First Island Chain is formed by Japan and its
northern and southern archipelagos, South
Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and the Greater
Sunda Islands. The Second Island Chain runs
from the Japanese archipelago south to the
Bonin and Marianas islands (including Guam)
and finally to the Palau group. See map above
8. Rather than building on Zheng He’s achieveand Liu, Memoirs of Liu Huaqing, p. 437. Some
ments, the Ming Dynasty Yongle emperor’s
unofficial Chinese publications even suggest that
successors for “several centuries” enforced such
America’s Hawaiian bases are part of a Third
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Island Chain. For a detailed graphic from the
PRC naval studies community that shows all
[Zu Ming], “
three “island chains,” see

阻明
美
国驻西太地区海军兵力部署与基地体系示意
图” [A Schematic Diagram of the U.S. Naval
Forces Deployed and System of Bases in the
Western Pacific], 舰船知识 [Naval & Mer-

chant Ships], no. 2 (January 2006), p. 24. A recent issue of China’s official People’s Daily,
however, mentions only two “island chains,”
the first and the second. See “
” [U.S. Navy Preoccupied with Major Ad[People’s Daily], 9 July
justment],
2004.

整

美军忙著大调

人民日报

Chinese analysts view the “island chains” alternatively as benchmarks of China’s progress in
maritime force projection and as fortified barriers that China must continue to penetrate to
achieve freedom of maneuver in the maritime
realm. See, for example, Alexander Huang,
“The Chinese Navy’s Offshore Active Defense
Strategy: Conceptualization and Implications,”
Naval War College Review 47, no. 3 (Summer
1994), p. 18. Because neither the PLA Navy nor
any other organization of the PRC government
has publicly made the island chains an integral
part of official policy or defined their precise
scope, however, Senior Captain Xu’s reference to
island chains must be interpreted with caution.
12. This is apparently a reference to reports that
China arranged to lease the Russian Far Eastern
port of Zarubino in 2003. See, for example,
Vladislav Seregin, Китай Получит Порт в
России [China Will Receive a Port in Russia],
RBC Daily, December 15, 2003, available at
www.rbcdaily.ru/news/company/index.shtml
?2003/12/15/49395.
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(jinhai) has been
14. Here the Chinese term
(yuantranslated as “offshore.” The term
(yuanyang),
hai), like its rough synonym
may be translated as “open ocean.” To avoid
(gonghai),
confusion with the word
which appears later in this translation, these
terms are deliberately not translated here as
“high seas.” The latter term has maritime legal
implications that may not correspond to those
that Beijing applies to yuanhai and yuanyang.
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(yanhai) and
The related terms
(haian) may be translated as “coastal;”
(jinan) as “inshore” (between
(binhai) and
(zhonghai)
“coastal” and “offshore”); and
perhaps as “mid-distance seas” (between “offshore” and “open ocean”). For a detailed diagram and explanation of these terms, see Huang,
“Chinese Navy’s Offshore Active Defense Strategy,” pp. 16–19. These terms do not relate to
specific geographic distances per se but rather to
conceptual areas for naval defense and power
projection progressively further from shore. The
distance ranges to which these terms pertain,
while relative as opposed to absolute, do appear
to have expanded in scope in parallel to growth
in the PLA Navy’s capabilities. To date, however,
perhaps to preserve strategic flexibility, neither
the PLA Navy nor any other organization of the
PRC government has publicly defined the precise meaning of these terms.

近岸

中海

Initially, the PLA Navy was a coastal defense
force. During the late 1970s, the PLA Navy sent
submarines into the South China Sea and beyond the First Island Chain into the Pacific
Ocean for the first time. By the mid-1980s it had
developed broader ability to conduct “
” (offshore operations) as part of a larger “
” (naval strategy) of “
” (offshore defense) approved by Deng Xiaoping and
articulated and implemented by PLA Navy
commander Adm. Liu Huaqing. In 1983, Admiral Liu recalls, “I stressed that we should achieve
a unified understanding of the concept of ‘offshore’ according to Comrade [Deng] Xiaoping’s
instructions. Our ‘offshore’ areas are the Yellow
Sea, East China Sea, South China Sea, the seas
around the Spratly Islands and Taiwan and inside and outside the Okinawa island chain, as
well as the northern part of the Pacific.” The
strategic guidance for the PLA Navy is currently
,
represented by eight characters:
(active defense, offshore operations—jiji
fangyu, jinhaizuozhan). The former “four characters” has a more general application for all
(miliservice branches of the PLA, as
tary strategy—junshizhanlue) or a
(military strategic guideline—junshi zhanlue
fangzhen). The later “four characters” refers to
the PLA Navy’s area of responsibility. For quotation, see Liu, Memoirs of Liu Huaqing, p. 434; for
other data see former PLA Navy commander
[Shi Yunsheng],
(1996–2003) Admiral
[China Navy
introduction,
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Encyclopedia], vol. 1 (Beijing:
[Sea Tide Press], 1998), pp. 16–31; Huang,
“Chinese Navy’s Offshore Active Defense Strategy,” pp. 16–19.
15. This, and all other references to “high seas,” are
(gonghai), a quasi-legal term
derived from
that literally means “common seas.”

公海

16. China Ocean Mineral Resources Research and
Development Association (COMRA) filed an
application as a preferred “registered pioneer
investor” on 5 March 1991 and was recently
awarded the right to explore for undersea minerals in the central Pacific. See “Areas for Exploration of Polymetallic Nodules: Pioneer
Investor Application Areas,” International
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Seabed Authority, available at www.isa.org.jm/
[Li Shangyi], “
,
en/default.htm;
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[Yang Xiaoguang and Fan Jie], “
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24, no. 1 (February 2004), pp. 1–4;
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